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The study of the legislative process is as vast and as complex as the

535 individual members of Congress. The sheer amount of literature
available on the topic demands a sma!!er scope. This examination of the
legislative process will specifically deal with the role of the legislator, the
nature of representation, and the legislator's relationship with constituents.
By utilizing different readings and practical participation, the role
constituents play in determining or affecting the decisions of l'le legislator
<'.nd the legislator's political roles will be analyzed. Ultimately, a legislator
faces a paradox in respect to the type of representative and political roles he
or she chooses.

Individual members of Congress embody many different roles such as
L",gislakr, Constituency Servant, Mentor/Comnmnicator, Representative,
Politico, OVHseer, Institutional Broker, and Office Manager. Often these roles
v-lill oVHlap each oL'1er. While each Congress member performs many of
the"e roles, sometimes simultaneously, each legislator has their o\oll!l
The role ()f Legislator demands attention to the rUles, procedures, and
traditions of each particular chamber. The Legislator role includes the
formal aspects of a Congressperson's position such as legislative work,
investigation, and committee specialization. A major aspect of this role is
acl1ievi:lg a sort of expertise on particular issues through research. One
legislator said, "Ivly first responsibility is to develop committee expertise.
I'm expected to learn all there is to be knoVllIl on an issue... I want to be an
expert, sought out by other members and able to help them" (Davidson
Oleszek, p.

116).

Expertise is important not only for effective policy

formation, but also to achieve influence and leadership status.
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Another major role is that of Constituency Servant. In this role,
legislators concentrate on working for tile people back home. A member of
Congress will try to secure small business loans, money for education, public
works projects, crop or business subsidies, or other federal grants and
projects. As former representative Michael Myers, D-PA, said, "It's a big pie
do\vT! in Wasl1ington, each member's sent there to bring a piece of that pie
back home. And if you go down there and you don't-you come back without
milkin' it after a few terms... you don't go... back" (Davidson & Oleszek, p.
117).
In t.'le Mentor ICommunicator role, the legislator deals witil the act of
legislating and constituency service. The aspect of legislating involves .
worl(ing ,,"ith issues of a particular importance to one's constituents,
educating memt1ers of Congress on these issues, gaining support from felloVi
colleagues (possibly t.hrough co-sponsorship), and seeing tile issue through
the 199islative process which ultimately concludes with the vote. Follo'h;ng
t,11e vot'?, the legislator \1,Tii! convey the vie-vIIS of Congress back to the
cons:titu~nts

.

.'o.:10t11e:' corr,ponent of this role is the job of keeping in touch with the
"grass roots," or in other words, the constituents back home. This
COll".munication is achieved t.!lrough many channels such as mail, personal
appearances (such as town meetings), print, television, and radio.
Closel;.-· related to this Mentor ICommunicator role is acting as an Issue
Emissary or Representative. Legislators assuming this role realize that
constituents expect t.'leir representatives to understand and act on their
intHests in Congress. As one legislator said, to act as "a symbol of tileir
connect!<)!l Wit11 the federal government" (Davidson & O1eszek, p. 118). This
role is th;:. foundation of our representative democrac;.-·, and legislators
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realize t.11e importance of this service. Legislators vvho ignore constituents
can face losing re-election.
Some other roles law makers hold include acting as Capitol Hill
insiders. Insiders are the "movers and the shakers" who are privy to the
behind the scenes action on Capitol Hill. Insiders deal with influential people
and understand the in's and out's of politics. In contrast to the insiders,
some legislators assume a more maverick role and are seen more as
outsiders. Other legislators tend to concentrate on other roles such as party
leadership p,::>~.itions, social obligations, or institutional brokerage.
Institutional Brokers spend time dealing ",ith the executive branch, interest
group's, and relations to state and local governments. Still other law makers
are committed t::> campaigning and winning reelection. A former legislator
commented candidly on this role. "All members of Congress have a primary
interest in being reelected. Some members have no other interest"
~

(Davidso:!.

&

01eszek, p. 11 g). Finally, other legislators concentrate their

efforts on being an Office Iv!anager. Law makers tend to have several office
locations Wl1icl1 require attention. While in the office, legislators work "lith
their staffs in addition to completing necessary paperwork. Each legislator
spends different amounts of time in these various roles according to his or
her own unique style.
While legislator's roles vary from law maker to law maker, the nature
of representation is fundamental to political life. "Representation is one of
t.11e

most pervasive and important processes of politica11ife" (Davidson &

Oleszelc, p. 122). Representation is the framework of the democracy in the
United States as well as other democratic regimes committed to sharing
power wiL':l its citizens. While the size and population of the United States
makes direct democracy virtually impossible, citizens control policy decisions

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

by electing representatives to act on their behalf. Representatives act on
their constituency's interest working in the legislative process. Hanna Pitkin
states the idea like this
The representative must act in such a way that, although he is
independent, and his constituents are capable of action and
jUdgment, no conflict arises between them. He must act in
their interest, and this means he must not normally come
into conflict with their wishes (Davidson & Oleszek, p. 122).
While this description of democratic representation is ideal in·theory, not all
legislator /constituency relationships are like this in practice.
According to incumbent legislators inten'iewed in 1977,
representation had high priority, and 30% of the members considered
themselves constituency servants. A majority of these law makers assumed
the role of mentor -communicators; ot.tlers fit into the roles of issue
spokespersons (Davidson & Oleszek, p. 122).
While the importance of representation is not questioned by
legislators, the issue of interpretation is different. An interpretation by
Edmund Burke states that legislators should voice the "general reason of the
y.11l.01e," rather than v.lorking solely for "local purposes" and "local prejudices"
(Davidson & Oleszek, p. 122). Legislators who advocate this interpretation
often come into conflict with their constituents. Today's constituencies do
not share Burke's position. People are motivated by self -interest and tend to
elect legislators v-mo will bring something back to the district. Whether
legislators choose to work solely for constituent interest (Delegate), follow
tl1eir own initiative (Trustee), or choose something in between (Politico),
depends on each law maker's personal style of representation and focus of
representation in respect to the nation, their constituents, or a combination
of the tV{o.
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Legislators, in an effort to remedy this paradox of representational
styles, adapt to certain situations. In other words, they are Politicos. After
interviev.ling a1members of Congress, David C. Kozak concluded, "that role
orientations varied with a 'force field' of factors, including the amount of
available information and the level of controversy' (Davidson & Oleszek, p.
123). Furthermore, Thomas Cavanagh concludes that legislators, in their
decision making process, consider factors such as national interest, personal
conscience, and constituency interests. "The weight assigned to each factor
varies according to the nature of the issue at hand, the availability of Llle
information necessary for a decision, and the intensity of preference of the
people concerned about the issue" (Davidson & Oleszek, p. 123).
lvlost members of Congress formulate strategies to assist them in their
decision making process. Members learn to distinguish at \oI1hat times certain
roles are warrante(i. Kozak continues, "Hot votes are associated with a
Delegate role and a local orientation,' \oI1hile "on low profile decisions, a
perceived Trustee role and national orientation dominate" (Davidson &
Oleszek, p. 123). According to a survey, policy issues that were considered
as aspects of personal conscience or discretion were placed in two categories:
issues of serious national consequence, such as foreign policy and national
defense, and issues that touched personal feelings, such as abortion, gun
contrOl, or constitutional matters. While on the other hand, legislators
claimed constituent influence \oI1hen deciding on economic decisions, such as
public works, social needs, military projects, and farm programs.
In brief, any time that legislators act, take a position, or vote they
consider both constituency interests and their own knowledge and
conscience. While their determinants of voting and roles vary from issue to
issue, legislatxs d"velop certain strategies and priorities to deal with this
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paradox in r€'presentation. Members of Congress are always aware that they
are held accountable for their actions by constituents and may b€' called
upon to explain their actions. This accountability influences a legislator's
decisions and is the major aspect in the legislator's paradox.
Turning now to th€' l€'gislator's r€,lationship with constitu€'nts r€'v€'als a
long standing controv€'rsy. 'Control by the local constituency is at one pole
of both the great normativ€' controv€'rsies about r€'pr€'s€'ntation that hav€'
arisen in modern times" (Parker, p. 459). At on€' €'nd of the r€'pr€'s€'ntation
spectrum is constitu€'ncy control, and at the oth€'r €'xtrHl1e is Burke's position
of serving constitu€'nt interest but not th€'ir will. The degree to v.llich th€'
r€'pr'?S€'ntative should be compelled by tlle "constituency vote" to follow
th€'ir constituE'ncy's wishE'S has been at the c€'nter of t1lis continuing
controv€'rsy for

OVH

150 years (Parker, p. 459).

Some political scientists feel that the legislator Iconstituency
re!.?tio!1sllip hav€' little to do vvitil issues of public policy but stem from
et.!1nic identifications 'Alitl1

t.~e

district, or by skillfully prOViding benefits

sucl"J as literature or major f€'deral projects to t1le people back home (Parker,
p 461). vVh€'ther it is tile fact that a constituency favors t.':!e l€'gislator
because of personal qualiti€'s, or because t1le l€'gislator keeps constitu€'nts
happy with new projects, the connection between constituent and legislator
may have little to do wit.':! issues of public policy.
This relationship may have som€' validity wh€'n on€' takes into account
citizen awareness or participation. "Far from looking over th€' shoulder of
tlleir Congressmen at the l€,gislative game, most Am€'ricans ar€' almost totally
uninl'xmed at,out legislative issues in Washington" (Parker, p. 461). Th€'
average person tias ideas on how tile country should be run, but looking at
votE'! turnout, even in Presidential elections, shows that most people are
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more talk tollan action. While constitu'S>nt awareness may be low, legislators
r'S>alize potential voter backlash and keep their sta."lds on issues 'Within limits.
According to the article

C<?DstJtll<?D<':Y ].oJ]U<?DC<? in C,..?Dgr<?ss,

Congressm'S>n tend to overestimate their visibility with constituents which
contributes to the legislator's difficulties in forming an accurate
understanding of constituency opinion. Normally, most legislator's contact
v.itl1 their constituents comes in the form of organized groups or 'With people
that are relatively well informed about politics. Overall, legislators only
kno,q constituents who write letters, who attend meetings, who have an
interest in policy, or people that the representative has direct1}' worked
v·,it.'l. Since tl"lis number of actual contacts are small in comparison to the
constituency district, tl"ie law mater only has a biased view of constituency
interest. These people probat.ly ov'S>r-represent the actual degree of political
informa:iorl and intHest of toile overall constituency.
To summarize, "for most Congressmen most of the tirne the electorate's
sandions are potential ra.tl"H'r tl"ian actual" (Parker, p. 469). Nevertl"i'S>less,
trii~;

pc·t?ntial threat of constituency sanctions and constituency influence still

remairi~,

and legislator's tat'S> th'S> L'lreat sHiously. Up to now, this

'S>xamination has used diffHent readings to explore this paradox. Now by
el".amining th'S> practical participation aspect, the role of the legislator, the
nature of representation, and the legislator's relationship with constituents
will be discussed.
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Looking back on Model lllinois Government 1991, I feelll1e simuiation
was again very exciting and educational. I feel very fortu.nate to have been
able toO attend another MIG. After being involved in MIG for four years and
being able to attend three simulations, I find each one more rewarding than
the last. I attended my first MIG as a freshman and needless to say I was a
little nervous and intimidated upon arrival. I did not know What to expect.
The first day in session was a very eye opening experience. There was so
much toO learn, and I learned by watching, listening, and asking a few
queo.tions to OttlH members of ttle delegation. The first day was the hardest,
and! gn.dU9.l1y began to feel more comfortable as each day went by. The
first day l1elped me to grasp v.hat was going on and how to effectively
particip;3 th. By the end of the simulation, I was feeling comfortable in the
erlvironment and comfortable 'ATittl the position and the duties I possessed.
Unfortunately, the simulation was over, but I was eager for next year.
At ttle st2.rt of my second !vHG, it v.a~; a good feeling to have some
experience behind me and a good idea of 'Y'lhat to expect. I felt very
comformble and enjoyed participating and interacting will1 other delegates.
After attending MIG for a second year, I felt tilat ! had really grown from
my firot experience and learned even more about the workings of t11e lllinois
General Assembly.
Model lllinois Government 1991 was my third simulation and my
most enjoyable. Being the minority spokesperson for my committee, I was
able to actively participate in the work of the committee. Even though the
Repu1:,lican members of our committee were in the minority, we were able to
l'.old some leverage in the committee and to ",in a couple of victories. Our
committee's advantage vvas our past experience and the fact we were
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comfortabl& 'Nit.'l Rob&rt's Rul&s of Ord&r and Parliamentary Proc&dur&. Now,
I want to focus t.!}is pap&[ on one obs&rvation I had of MIG and compare it to
th& "r&al" G&n&ral Ass&mbly.
Whi1& much of th& MIG simulation is V&ry r&a1istic from closed door
bargaining to actually sitting in th& big chair in th& chamber, th&re ar&
certain asp&cts "mich do not really d&pict l&gislativ& r&ality. On& issu& wllich
I t.'lought was a litt1& unf&a1iStiC was the voting styles of th& del&gates. Most
of th& votes s&&m&d to end up on a ·party lin&" or "parri unity· basis. party
unity votes is d&fined by Congressional Quarterly as votes in which a
majority of voting Reput,licans oppose a majority of voting Democrats. It is
true that "party affiliation remains the strongest single correlate of
members' voting d&cisions: but "ttle U.S. Congress rarely votes along straight
party lines" (Davidson & Oleszek, 1985 p. 300). In a typical year, from one
third

t~

one-half of all floor votes are party line or party unity votes.

Or,e determinant of voting ttlat I felt was missing was constituency
based voti"g. CO!lstituency based voting can be similar to partisan voting
".'11en certair, distrid a.rea; usually elect Republicans or Democrats.
ConstituHlcies affect lavlInakers' decisions i!J two ways. The first way
involves people electing a legislator who shares the same view of the
constituents. This v;ay a legislator's vote 'NiH reflect the will of the
constituents TIle second way involves the ever present threat of defeat.
Wilen a legislator's vote is at odds 'Nith those of his constituency, the
legislator is taking t.!}e chance of creating a voter outcry v,711ich could cost him
a re-election bid. T11erefore, legislators stray from party ranks when they
fe€'l tt,eir constituents 'NiH not benefit from t.'le party's policies.
Ow'1.er detHminants of voting include ideology, executive pressur&, CU&
giving and CU& taking, along 'Nitlll&gislati'''& bargaini:lg. In brief, ideology is
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an L'11portant determinant of voting because legislators have well-developed
ideological positions. A legislator's position can fal! anywhere on the
left/right spectrum from liberalism to conservatism.
Executive pressure from either a governor or a president does
influence decisions made by legislators. The executive sets the legislative
agenda and can pressure members to lend their support. Some important
factors affecting an executive's legislative effectiveness are partisan control
of Congress, age of tenure, and nature of their initiatives. All these factors
effect t.te legislative effectiveness of an executive.
Cue giving and cue taking are L'Tlportant determinants of voting. Since
a !av,,'t"fl3.ker f9::es a huge n\h'11ber of votes, it is difficult to be fully informed
on all of ~le is'oues Due to t..'lis limited information, legislators rely heavily
on cues fr,)rn. ot1-lers in deciding
Th.:.
___
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" "a' a'.:.te'"mit"lat"lt
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bargaining Barg3.ining is an excl1ange where "goals or resources pass from a
barg,~iner's

hands in return for other goals or resources that he or she

valuB(' (Davidson S: Oleszek, 1965 p. 390). Logrolling is a bargaining
stratEgy h, 'ill"lid, tile parties trade off support so that each may gain its goal.
At tile heart of logrolling is a term called "pork barrel." A pork barrel
pact.age of

legi~'lation

is a something-for-everyone enactment. Pork barrel

legisl9.tion often deals with SUbjects such as public works, omnibus taJlation,
tariffs, and trade. In order for legislation to pass, something vvas added to
the bill to satisfy each supporting legislator.
Unfortu.nately Ule text I am using for a reference is aimed at the
legislative process at tile national level, but the voting determinants hold
true at the state level also. At hHG, I found myself SUbject to each of these
deterrninants. I vviSl"l ! had more information about my district so I could
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have 1nade more informed decisk>ns that ",ould please my constituents.
Vlit1wut sufficient l~noVJledge of the district I was representing, I found
myself votirlg on a party and ideology basis. I would have enjoyed
representing my home district.
In closing, Model !1linois Government enables a student to get hands .
on training in the legislative process. MIG also enables a person to put to
practice those concepts learned in class. Living the part of a politician is
mucl'1 more exciting than reading a text.
Irl conclusion, legislator's adapt to different situations and issues. This
f1ezi";)ility in decision Inaking helps a la\l" maker to solve the paradox in
representational roles and constituency influence. After researching this
topic 03.":1 after talting ,,,,ill., Senator Paul Simon, most law makers feel t.'le
ill ore;er to mal:", a decision. In other words, he does not do everyt.'ling his

;)avidscn, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek (1955). Congress and Its
~,;!embHs

2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, .

Pa.rker, Glenn R. (1955). Studies Of Congress. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly.

